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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
could properly be paid to one who was under an obligation to assign it to
the Legal Aid Defender Fund of the Cleveland Welfare Federation has
already been decided in the McCurdy case, the court said. Notices of ap-
peal have been filed by both plaintiffs, so the final chapter has not yet
been written. Perhaps next year's survey of Ohio Law will contain the




RES JUDICATA AND ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT
In Brinkman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad1 the Court of Appeals
for Montgomery County was presented with the question of whether a
verdict in favor of the defendant in a wrongful death action gives rise to
the doctrines of res judicata or estoppel by judgment when, subsequent
to the wrongful death action, one of the several persons for whose bene-
fit the wrongful death action was brought brings an action for personal
injuries which resulted from the same alleged negligence of the defend-
ant. The court, finding all necessary conditions present, held that both
doctrines were applicable.' Of particular interest is the court's holding
that there was an identity of parties in both actions.
In holding that there was an identity of parties, the court relied upon
the case of Gibson v. Solomon.' Although the fact situation in Gibson
was similar to that in Brinkman, it should be noted that the party in-
volved in the later personal injuries action in Gibson was, unlike its
Brinkman equivalent, also the administrator of the decedent's estate, and
thus, the party who had control over the earlier wrongful death action.
Because of this difference, the merit of extending the reasoning in Gibson
to the fact situation in Brinkman is open to some doubt. Admitting, as
was held in Gibson, that the beneficiaries are the real parties in interest
in a wrongful death action, a question arises as to whether this factor
alone should be enough to satisfy the requirement that there be an
*This article was written by Daniel B. Davis with the guidance of Samuel Sonenfield,
formerly Associate Professor of Law at Western Reserve Law School.
1. 111 Ohio App. 317, 165 N.E.2d 239 (1960).
2. The plaintiff contended only that there were not: (1) an identity of parties, and (2)
an identity of causes of action. As stated by the court, four conditions must be present in
order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, those conditions being: (1) identity of
parties, (2) identity of causes of action, (3) identity of subject matter, and (4) identity in
the quality of persons for or against whom the claim is made.
3. 136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N.E.2d 996 (1939).
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identity of parties in both actions. The requirement that there be an
identity of parties is based upon the reasoning that a party should not be
bound by a court's decision unless he has had an opportunity to represent
his own interest in the earlier case. There is some doubt as to whether
one of several persons for whose benefit a wrongful death action has been
brought has that degree of control over the action which would justify a
holding that that person had an opportunity adequately to represent his
own interest.4 Where, however, as in Gibson, the party involved in the
later action for personal injuries was the administrator who brought the
wrongful death action and also one of the parties for whose benefit the
wrongful death action was brought, it appears that such a party has had
an adequate opportunity to represent his own interests in the earlier
action.
In Videtto v. Marsh5 it was held that where an infant, by his father
as next friend, brings an action for personal injuries and loses through
failure to prove that the defendant was negligent, such a decision does
not estop or bar the father from bringing an action for consequential
damages against the same defendant even though the negligence alleged
arose during the same occurrence.6
SERVICE OF SUMMONS
In Sours v. Director of Highways7 a question arose whether the
fastening of a summons to the outside doorknob of a residence constitutes
valid residence service. Section 2703.08 of the Ohio Revised Code pro-
vides that "service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons
... to the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy at his usual place
of residence." In Sours, the sheriff took the summons to the defendant's
usual place of residence. Finding no one present, he attached the sum-
mons to the doorknob of the residence. In holding that the action of the
sheriff did not comply with the provisions of section 2703.08, the court
stated that in order for there to be valid residence service there must be
strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Furthermore, the man-
ner in which the summons is left at defendant's residence must be of such
a nature that it is reasonably probable that the person so served will
actually receive the notice. Although the sheriff actually left the sum-
mons at the usual place of residence, the court felt that the manner in
which it was left was such that the defendant could not reasonably have
been expected to receive it. The court said:
4. See 22 OHIO ST. UJ. 433 (1961), where the cases cited point out that the person
for whose benefit a wrongful death action is brought may not file pleadings or personally
select counsel to represent his own interests.
5. 112 Ohio App. 151, 175 N.E.2d 764 (1960).
6. See Recent Decision, p. 600 infra, for a further discussion of the case.
7. 172 Ohio St. 242, 175 N.E.2d 77 (1961).
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One must take into consideration the fact that today it is a common prac-
tice of large numbers of advertisers and other door-to-door canvassers
to attach their sundry materials to the doorknobs of homes by means of
rubber bands or otherwise .... It is common experience for persons first
entering the house ... to immediately dispose of it or at best to make no
more than cursory inspection of such papers.8
It should be noted, however, that the court emphasized that whether the
manner in which the summons is left at one's usual place of residence
constitutes valid residence service is a question of fact "which must be
determined under the facts and circumstances of each case."'
In Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Incorporated"° summons was served
upon a non-employee of the defendant corporation. The officers of the
corporation were, however, notified of the summons prior to the running
of the statute of limitations. The trial court sustained defendant's motion
to quash service of summons. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
affirmed the trial court's decision. The Ohio Supreme Court, in a unani-
mous decision, reversed the decision of the lower court and held that un-
der Ohio Revised Code section 2703.10, there may be valid service where
the person served is not an employee of the defendant corporation."
SERVICE OF AN AFFIDAVIT TO OBTAIN A MECHANIC'S LIEN
Under Ohio Revised Code section 1311.07 a copy of an affidavit to
obtain a mechanic's lien must, within thirty days after the filing of the
affidavit, be served upon the:
Owner, part owner, or lessee of such premises or his agent, but if none
of such persons be found within the county where such premises are
situated, then such copy shall be served by posting the same in some
conspicuous place on such premises within ten days after the expiration
of said thirty days.
In Scagnetti Inc. v. Pleister2 a copy of an affidavit was, pursuant to
the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 1311.19, served by a regis-
tered letter sent to the last known place of residence of the property
owner. Unknown to the plaintiff, the defendant had moved several
times and had left no forwarding address. Defendant, however, con-
tinued to receive his mail by general delivery. The registered letter ar-
rived at the post office eight days before the end of the statutory thirty
day period, but was not picked up by the defendant until two days after
the expiration of that period. Meanwhile, the plaintiff did not, within
8. Id. at 245, 175 N.E.2d at 79.
9. Id. at 244, 175 N.E.2d at 78.
10. 172 Ohio St. 402, 176 N.E.2d 410 (1961). See also discussion in Recent Decision,
p. 605 infra, and in Corporations, Partnerships and Associations section, p. 453 supra.
11. See Recent Decisions, p. 605 infra, for a further discussion of the case.
12. 172 Ohio St. 260, 175 N.E.2d 81 (1961).
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ten days after the expiration of the thirty day period, post a copy of the
affidavit on the premises. The supreme court, in holding that there was
valid service, accepted the trial court's reasoning that the post office be-
came the agent of the defendant and even though the defendant did not
actually receive the letter until after the statutory thirty day period "that
this delivery was a substantial compliance with the law."1 Further, since
the defendant had notice of the filing of the lien, the court held that the
plaintiff did not have to post a copy of the affidavit on the premises.14
As pointed out by the court, the decision should be considered in light
of the fact that the defendant did not make certain contentions which
possibly could have changed the decision as to whether there had been
substantial compliance with the statutory provisions. For example, there
was no contention that the address used by the plaintiff was not the last
place of residence known to the plaintiff, or that the defendant did not
actually receive the copy of the affidavit.1 For this reason, the case
should not be considered to have substantially changed the rule that the
statutory provisions in question are to be strictly construed."6
PLEADING - MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
In Vesey v. Connally the Court of Appeals for Lucas County was
faced with the question whether plaintiff's petition stated a cause of
action for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff alleged that while he had
originally been found guilty of the misdemeanor in question, this decision
had subsequently been reversed. The court, in holding that the plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action, stated that the allegation of a prior con-
viction raised a presumption of probable cause, which constitutes a valid
defense in an action for malicious prosecution. The court stated, how-
ever, that a cause of action would have been stated if the plaintiff's peti-
tion had alleged facts disclosing that the original conviction had been
obtained by means of fraudulent or perjured testimony, or through unfair
means employed by the defendant.
FINAL ORDER OR JUDGMENT
In Preister v. State Foundry Company8 plaintiff's motion for a sum-
mary judgment was sustained as to a portion of his claim. At this point
13. Id. at 263, 175 N.E.2d at 83.
14. While the court speaks in terms of notice, it is not dear whether it is referring to
constructive notice before the end of the thirty-day statutory period or actual notice within
the ten-day period following said thirty-day period.
15. 172 Ohio St. 260, 263, 175 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1961).
16. See, e.g., Edgemont Coal v. Gaylor, 100 Ohio App. 42, 133 N.E.2d 651 (1955).
17. 112 Ohio App. 225, 175 N.E.2d 876 (1960).
18. 172 Ohio St. 28, 173 N.E.2d 136 (1961).
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the defendant appealed. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial
court's order with respect to a portion of the plaintiff's claim was not a
judgment which may be the subject of an appeal. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court relied upon Ohio Revised Code section 2323.01 which,
while it provides that pursuant to a motion for summary judgment a
court may enter an order as to part of a party's claim, also indicates that
such an order is not actually a judgment which may be the subject of an
appeal. The court held that in order to have a judgment under section
2323.01 which may be the subject of an appeal, the judgment must be
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked. 9
SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION - SUBROGATION AGREEMENTS
In Rush v. Maple Heights2" it was held that where a person suffers
both personal injuries and property damage as a result of the same wrong-
ful act, only a single cause of action arises. This decision cast consider-
able doubt upon the status of the insurance subrogation cases. Viewed
against a background of many cases holding that a cause of action may
not be split, the question arose as to whether, or under what circum-
stances, the insured or the insurer could bring separate actions against a
tortfeasor. And if separate actions could be brought, there was a ques-
tion whether the insurer could, where it has become subrogated to only
a part of the property damage claim, bring a separate action for that part
of the property damage.
In Hoosier Casualty Company v. Davis"' the supreme court answered
some of the questions which were raised by its decision in Rush. The
Hoosier Casualty Company, having become subrogated to only a part of
its insured's property damage claim, brought a separate action for that
part of the property damage claim. In his answer the defendant alleged
that the insured had, prior to the time of the insurer's action, brought an
action for personal injuries, and that that action was terminated by a set-
tlement and was dismissed without prejudice to the bringing of a new
action. In its reply the plaintiff admitted the above facts, but further
alleged that the defendant knew of the plaintiff's interest prior to enter-
ing into the settlement with the plaintiff's insured. The trial court sus-
tained the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court
of Appeals for Marion County reversed the judgment and remanded the
19. In reaching ts decision the court relied heavily upon the case of Biggins v. Oltineur
Iron Works, 154 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1946). A different conclusion was reached in Biggins
because of a slight variation in the factual pattern, but, as to the legal question in Pleister the
court in Biggins reached the same conclusion.
20. 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958). See Sonenfield, Survey of Ohio Law -
Civil Procedure, 10 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 349 (1959).
21. 172 Ohio St. 5, 173 N.E.2d 349 (1961).
[VoL 13: 3
1962] CVI PROCEDU E
action to the trial court. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals.
In affirming the decision, the court held that the subrogee of a part
of a property damage claim may bring an action on that claim even where
the insured has brought a separate action for personal injuries which has
been settled and dismissed prior to the bringing of the insurer's action.
The court, in so holding, stated that the decision in Rush v. Maple
Heights22 overruled only paragraph four of the syllabus in Vasu v. Kohl-
ers23 and thus paragraphs six, seven, and eight remained unaffected.24
Thus the holding in Vasu that the insured was not barred from bringing
a separate action for personal injuries where its insurer had earlier
brought an action for property damage, was not conditioned upon the
fact that there were two separate causes of action. While reaffirming its
holding that a single cause of action arises where a person suffers both
personal injuries and property damage as a result of a single wrongful
act, the court in Hoosier Casualty Company further stated that it adhered
to the rule that a cause of action may not be split. Nevertheless, the
court in effect allowed a splitting when it held that the assignee under a
subrogation agreement may bring a separate action.
It should be noted that the court did not hold that the insurer may
prosecute a separate action under all circumstances. As Judge Taft stated
in his concurring opinion, the insurer's right to bring a separate action is
not unlimited. Upon close examination of the opinions, it appears that
the insurer may prosecute a separate action only where the defendant in
22. 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.B.2d 599 '(1958).
23. 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
24. Paragraphs six, seven, and eight of Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 322 (1945)
provide that:
"6. Where an injury to person and to property through a single wrongful act causes
a prior contract of indemnity and subrogation as to the injury to property, to come into
operation for the benefit of the person injured, the indemnitor may prosecute a separate
action against the party causing such injury for reimbursement for indemnity monies paid
under such contract.
"7. Parties in privy, in the sense that they are bound by a judgment, are those who
acquired an interest in the subject matter after the beginning of the action or the rendition
of the judgment; and if their title or interest attached before that fact, they are not bound
unless made parties.
"8. The grantor or assignor is not bound, as to third persons, by any judgment which
such third persons may obtain against his grantee or assignee adjudicating the title to or
claim for the interest transferred, unless he participated in the action in such manner as
to become, in effect, a party."
25. As pointed out by Judge Taft in his concurring opinion in Hoosier, Ohio Revised
Code section 2307.05 provides that an action must be brought in the name of the real
party in interest, and further, under section 2307.20 parties united in interest must be
joined. If the tortfeasor does not require the insured and the insurer to bring their action
jointly, he has, as provided in section 2309.10, waived the defect of parties which exists
under the provisions of section 2309.08. Where the tortfeasor has knowingly waived his
right to have the insurer and its insured joined, this fact should not preclude the insurer or
its insured from subsequently bringing a second action.
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the earlier action, with knowledge of the insurer's interest in the cause of
action, has failed to require that the insurer be made a party to the
action brought by the insured.25
In Motorists Mutual v. Gerson" the plaintiff paid its insured $119
for property damage which the insured had sustained as a result of a col-
lision with a truck which was driven by the defendant. Since the in-
sured's policy had a fifty dollar deductible clause, the insurer became sub-
rogated to the insured's claim only to the extent that it exceeded fifty
dollars. Subsequent to entering into the subrogation agreement, the in-
sured, for the sum of $50 signed a release with the defendant for all
claims arising out of the collision. The trial court held that the release
barred the plaintiff's action for its share of the property damage claim.
The Court of Appeals for Lorain County, in reversing the trial court's de-
cision, held that it could be inferred from the facts of the case that the
defendant had knowledge of the insurer's rights under the subrogation
agreement. Further, the court held that where a tortfeasor has knowl-
edge of an insurer's interest under a subrogation agreement, a release
given by the insured to the tortfeasor will not bar the insurer from sub-
sequently bringing an action to recover his portion of the property dam-
age claim."
In American Insurance Company v. Ellsworth28 the insurer brought
an action to recover on a property damage claim to which it had become
subrogated. Defendant alleged that the plaintiff's insured had recovered
a judgment upon a verdict in his favor in an earlier personal injury
action, and thus the plaintiff was barred from bringing the action for
property damage. The court held, however, that the insured's action for
personal injuries did not bar the insurer from subsequently bringing a
separate action for the subrogated property damage. 9
In Allstate v. Dye3" the insurer brought an action against its insured
to recover amounts which it had paid to the insured. After the insurer
had paid its insured, and had become subrogated to part of the insured's
claim, the insured settled his claim against the tortfeasor. The court
found that the tortfeasor had, at the time of the settlement, no notice of
the insurer's interest. In holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
from its insured, the court stated that the plaintiff was, by its insured's
26. 113 Ohio App. 321, 177 N.E.2d 790 (1960).
27. See Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Vokert, 58 Ohio St. 362, 50 N.E. 924 (1898).
Judge Taft, in his concurring opinion in Hoosier Casualty Company v. Davis, stated that the
Vokert case could alone be the basis for affirming the lower court's decision in Hoosier.
28. 113 Ohio App. 426, 178 N.E.2d 819 (1960).
29. The court makes no mention of the question of whether the tortfeasor knew of the
insurer's interest at the time the insured brought the action for personal injuries. Such
knowledge possibly could be inferred from the fact that the tortfeasor knew that there was
property damage for which no claim was made in the insured's action.
30. 113 Ohio App. 90, 170 N.E.2d 862 (1960).
[Vol. 13:3
